Fake Security App Found Abuses Japanese Payment System

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Fake Security App Found Abuses Japanese Payment System


Authored by SangRyol Ryu and Yukihiro Okutomi 

McAfee’s Mobile Research workforce lately analyzed new malware focusing on cellular fee customers in Japan. The malware which was distributed on the Google Play retailer pretends to be a professional cellular safety app, however it’s in reality a fee fraud malware stealing passwords and abusing reverse proxy focusing on the cellular fee companies. McAfee researchers notified Google of the malicious apps, スマホ安心セキュリティ, or ‘Smartphone Anshin Security’, package deal title ‘com.z.cloud.px.app’ and ‘com.z.px.appx’. The purposes are now not obtainable on Google Play. Google Play Protect has additionally taken steps to guard customers by disabling the apps and offering a warning. McAfee Mobile Security merchandise detect this risk as Android/ProxySpy.  

How Do Victims Install This Malware? 

The malware actor continues to publish malicious apps on the Google Play Store with numerous developer accounts. According to the data posted on Twitter by Yusuke Osumi, Security Researcher at Yahoo! Japan, the attacker sends SMS messages from abroad with a Google Play hyperlink to lure customers to put in the malware. To entice extra customers, the message entices customers to replace safety software program. 

A SMS message from France (from Twitter post by Yusuke)

A SMS message from France (from Twitter publish by Yusuke)

malware on Google play

Malware on Google Play 

The Mobile Research workforce additionally discovered that the malware actor makes use of Google Drive to distribute the malware. In distinction to putting in an utility after downloading an APK file, Google Drive permits customers to put in APK recordsdata with out leaving any footprint and makes the set up course of less complicated. Once the person clicks the hyperlink, there are only some extra touches required to run the applying. Only three clicks are sufficient if customers have beforehand allowed the set up of unknown apps on Google Drive. 

Following notification from McAfee researchers, Google has eliminated identified Google Drive recordsdata related to the malware hashes listed on this weblog publish. 

 



What does this malware seem like?

When a person installs and launches this malware, it asks for the Service password. Cleverly, the malware exhibits incorrect password messages to gather the extra exact passwords. Of course, it doesn’t matter whether or not the password is right or not. It is a approach of getting the Service password. The Service password is used for the fee service which gives simple on-line fees. The person can begin this fee service by setting a Service password. The cost might be paid together with the cell phone invoice. After the password exercise, the malware exhibits faux cellular safety display screen. Interestingly, the structure of the exercise is related to our previous McAfee Mobile Security. All buttons look real, however these are all faux. 

The Network password is used for the NTT DOCOMO fee service which gives simple on-line funds. NTT DOCOMO cellular community customers can begin this fee service by simply setting 4-digits password known as a Network password. The cost might be paid together with the cell phone invoice. When it is advisable to pay on-line, you may merely do the fee course of by coming into the 4-digits password.

After the password exercise, the malware exhibits a faux cellular safety display screen. Interestingly, the structure of the exercise is just like our previous McAfee Mobile Security. All buttons look real, however these are all faux.

Interface comparison.
Interface comparability.

How does this malware work?

There is a local library named ‘libmyapp.so’ loaded throughout the app execution written in Golang. The library, when loaded, tries to hook up with the C2 server utilizing a Web Socket. Web Application Messaging Protocol (WAMP) is used to speak and course of Remote Procedure Calls (RPC). When the connection is made, the malware sends out community info together with the telephone quantity. Then, it registers the consumer’s process instructions described within the desk under. The internet socket connection is stored alive and takes the corresponding motion when the command is acquired from the server like an Agent. And the socket is used to ship the Service password out to the attacker when the person enters the Service password on the exercise. 

RPC Function title  Description 
connect_to  Create reverse proxy and connect with distant server 
disconnect  Disconnect the reverse proxy 
get_status  Send the reverse proxy standing 
get_info  Send line quantity, connection sort, operator, and so forth 
toggle_wifi  Set the Wi-Fi ON/OFF 
show_battery_opt  Show dialog to exclude battery optimization for background work 

Registered RPC capabilities description 

Initial Hello packet contains personal information
Initial Hello packet incorporates private info
Sending out The Network password
Sending out The Network password

To make a fraudulent buy by utilizing leaked info, the attacker wants to make use of the person’s community. The RPC command ‘toggle_wifi’ can change the connection state to Wi-Fi or mobile community, and ‘connect_to’ will present a reverse proxy to the attacker. A reverse proxy can permit connecting the host behind a NAT (Network Address Translation) or a firewall. Via the proxy, the attacker can ship buy requests by way of the person’s community. 

Network and command flow diagram
Network and command stream diagram

Conclusion

It is an fascinating level that the malware makes use of a reverse proxy to steal the person’s community and implement an Agent service with WAMP. McAfee Mobile Research Team will proceed to search out this sort of risk and shield our prospects from cellular threats. It is recommended to be extra cautious when coming into a password or confidential info into untrusted purposes. 

IoCs (Indicators of Compromise)

193[.]239[.]154[.]23
91[.]204[.]227[.]132
ruboq[.]com 

SHA256  Package Name  Distribution  
5d29dd12faaafd40300752c584ee3c072d6fc9a7a98a357a145701aaa85950dd  com.z.cloud.px.app  Google Play 
e133be729128ed6764471ee7d7c36f2ccb70edf789286cc3a834e689432fc9b0  com.z.cloud.px.app  Other 
e7948392903e4c8762771f12e2d6693bf3e2e091a0fc88e91b177a58614fef02  com.z.px.appx  Google Play 
3971309ce4a3cfb3cdbf8abde19d46586f6e4d5fc9f54c562428b0e0428325ad  com.z.cloud.px.app2  Other 
2ec2fb9e20b99f60a30aaa630b393d8277949c34043ebe994dd0ffc7176904a4  com.jg.rc.papp  Google Drive 
af0d2e5e2994a3edd87f6d0b9b9a85fb1c41d33edfd552fcc64b43c713cdd956  com.de.rc.seee  Google Drive 

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